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Abstract
All health care systems face problems of justice and efficiency related to setting priorities for
allocating a limited pool of resources to a population. Because many of the central issues are the
same in all systems, the United States and other countries can learn from the successes and failures
of countries that have explicitly addressed the question of health care priorities.
We review explicit priority setting efforts in Norway, Sweden, Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the state of Oregon in the US. The approaches used can
be divided into those centered on outlining principles versus those that define practices. In order
to establish the main lessons from their experiences we consider (1) the process each country
used, (2) criteria to judge the success of these efforts, (3) which approaches seem to have met
these criteria, and (4) using their successes and failures as a guide, how to proceed in setting
priorities. We demonstrate that there is little evidence that establishment of a values framework
for priority setting has had any effect on health policy, nor is there evidence that priority setting
exercises have led to the envisaged ideal of an open and participatory public involvement in decision
making.
The challenge
One main challenge for health care systems is that
resources are limited, making it impossible to provide
everyone with every effective intervention they might
need or want. Scarcity raises questions of justice and effi-
ciency: how should limited health care resources be allo-
cated? What health services should be publicly funded?
How should indications for particular interventions be
defined? [1-6].
Priority setting or rationing in health care continues to be
a politically charged topic, but recently its necessity has
gained wider recognition [7-11]. Explicitly addressing pri-
ority setting is necessary to develop fairer methods of allo-
cation for scarce health care resources [7,10,12] and to
begin a public dialogue to ensure legitimacy in the process
[3,5].
In this paper we will examine seven countries, Israel, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom, and one state in the US, Ore-
gon, that have made explicit efforts to address health pri-
orities. While their systems differ, many core allocation
issues are the same [13-21]. The countries vary in how
health care is financed (Table 1). Some, such as the UK
and the Scandinavian countries, have tax based national
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lands, New Zealand and Israel, rely on various forms of
universal social insurance. The priority setting approaches
can be broadly grouped into two categories: outlining
principles and defining practices. In the following we will
discuss the efforts under two broad headings. Some coun-
tries such as Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Den-
mark decided to develop principles that would guide
prioritization efforts, while others, such as the UK, Israel,
New Zealand and the state of Oregon established bodies
that would actually recommend what services should be
provided within the system. In assessing their efforts we
will (1) describe the process each country or state used,
(2) suggest two broad criteria to judge the success of these
efforts, (3) assess which approaches seem to have met
these criteria, and (4) using their successes and failures as
a guide, make recommendations for priority setting. In
the country descriptions we will focus on the structure of
the process, and the principles and values guiding the
process. In the evaluation section we will assess the actual
impact of the priority setting exercises.
Explicit priority setting efforts: the outlining 
principles approach
Since the late 1980's many governments have instituted
transparent and explicit discussions about priorities for
health care [14,22]. These efforts took different forms: all
included health care experts, but they differed in inclusion
of government officials and public representatives (Table
2) and in the details of the frameworks they outlined
(Table 3). In most, if not all countries, the priority setting
efforts started in response to political reasons to address
the issue. In the UK, and to a certain extent the Scandina-
vian countries, the newspapers continuously reported
cases where patients were denied potential life saving
treatments, such as bone marrow transplantation for cer-
tain cancers. In the UK, in addition, there were reports of
differential access in different parts of the country, labeled
rationing by post-code. In Norway, the ever-expanding
waiting lists for treatment created political pressure for a
system that would prioritize patients on waiting lists. In
countries such as the Netherlands and Israel, new legisla-
tion regarding health insurance created a need to decide
what services should be provided in the package offered to
all citizens. In Oregon, although Medicaid would provide
Table 1: Health expenditure data for 2003*
Country Health expenditure as 
percent of gross domestic 
product
Percent of total health 
expenditure that is 
government funded
Percent of private health 
expenditure paid out of 
pocket
Per capita total health 
expenditure (average 
exchange rate (US$))
Norway 10.3 83.7 95.40 4,976
Netherlands 9.8 62.4 20.80 3,088
Sweden 9.4 85.2 92.10 3,149
Denmark 9.0 83.0 92.50 3,534
Israel 8.9 68.2 89.10 1,514
New Zealand 8.1 78.3 72.10 1,618
UK 8.0 85.7 76.70 2,428
US 15.2 44.6 24.30 5,711
*World Health Organization, Core Health Indicators, from World Health Statistics 2006
Table 2: Processes for priority setting discussions
Country Government officials 
included
Health professionals 
included
Public/lay representatives 
included
Government commission
Denmark NO YES YES YES
Israel YES YES YES YES‡
Netherlands NO YES NO YES
New Zealand NO YES NO† YES‡
Norway YES YES YES* YES
Sweden NO§ YES YES§ YES
UK NO YES YES NO
Oregon (US) YES YES YES YES
*patient representatives.
† indirectly, through public meetings and surveys.
‡ regular review process.
§included members of parliamentPage 2 of 13
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Country Principles, guidelines, recommendations
Year
Process
Norway Priority principles:
1987/1997 Lønning Committee I and II • Severity
• Potential effect
• Cost-effectiveness
Priority groups based on severity (and later funding):
• Fundamental
• Supplementary
• Low priority
• No public funding
The Netherlands Sieves/filters to determine basic package of services:
1992/1995 Dutch Committee on Choices in Health Care (Dunning 
Committee)
• Is care necessary?
• Is care efficient?
• Is care effective?
• Can care be left up to individual responsibility?
Sweden Ethical platform principles:
1993/1995 Commission of Parliament members and experts • Human dignity
• Need and solidarity
• Cost-efficiency
Political/administrative and clinical priority groups:
• Life-threatening acute diseases, severe chronic diseases and 
palliative terminal care
• Prevention and habilitation/rehabilitation
• Less severe acute diseases
• Borderline cases
• Care for reasons other than disease
Denmark Core values:
1997 Danish Council of Ethics • Equal human worth
• Solidarity
• Security and safety
• Freedom and self-determination
General goal, framed in terms of "opportunity for self-
expression...irrespective of social background and economic ability"
Partial goals:
• Social and geographical equity
• Quality
• Cost-effectiveness
• Democracy and consumer influence
Israel Criteria for prioritization of recommended technologies:
1995 Medical Technology Forum and National Advisory Committee, 
In response to new National Health Insurance Law
• Life-saving technology with full recovery
• Potential to prevent mortality or morbidity
• Number of patients to benefit
• Financial burden on society and the patient
• New technology for diseases with no alternative treatments 
available
• Brings increase in longevity and quality of life
• Benefits of reducing morbidity vs. improving quality of life
• Net gain is higher than short- or long-term cost
• Funding of efficacious treatment than is expensive to the individual, 
but of reasonable cost to society
New Zealand Set out principles to guide priority setting decisions:Page 3 of 13
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not everyone was covered, and the effort was launched in
part to eliminate high cost, low effectiveness interventions
and use the subsequent savings to increase the number of
people covered by Medicaid.
Norway
In 1987, in the context of increased demand for health
care resources and the question of how to prioritize their
use, the Norwegian government convened the Lønning
Commission, the first body to set forth principles for pri-
oritization and discuss their implementation[23,24]. The
commission decided to use severity of condition as the
exclusive basis for prioritization, outlining five priority
groups
▪ Emergency care for life-threatening diseases
▪ Treatment which prevents catastrophic or very serious
long-term consequences: example, cancer
▪ Treatment which prevents less serious long term conse-
quences: example, hypertension
▪ Treatment with some beneficial effects: example, com-
mon cold
▪ Treatment with no documented effects
They believed this division could guide funding decisions
for various treatments [24]. Ten years after the first, Nor-
way convened a second commission. This commission
acknowledged the need to take into account potential
effect and cost-effectiveness as secondary principles to be
balanced with severity, and introduced four priority
groups: core or fundamental services, supplementary serv-
ices, low priority services, and services with no priority.
The commission attempted to define what services should
be included in the first category by providing three crite-
ria:
▪ Risk of dying from disease within five years is more than
5–10% (severity)
▪ Increase in probability of five year survival is greater than
10% (expected treatment outcome)
▪ Costs reasonable in relation to benefits
This second commission focused more on the process of
setting priorities, than on the principles used to set them
[23,25]. One of their suggestions was that the process of
priority setting should be started by establishing clinician
groups that would set priorities within their specialties.
Netherlands
In 1990, the Netherlands established the Committee on
Choices in Health Care, the so-called Dunning Commit-
tee, to discuss methods and principles for setting priori-
ties. That year, the Dutch Cabinet decided to include
approximately 95% of available health services in the
publicly funded package [26,27]. The committee felt that
to ensure all necessary services could be readily provided,
non-essential services should be eliminated from the
package. It delineated four priority principles: necessity,
effectiveness, efficiency, and individual responsibility.
They described these principles as forming a sieve for sift-
ing out services that should not be publicly funded
("Dunning's funnel") [27]. The idea was that one should
apply these successively beginning with the principle of
Yearly, beginning in 1993 Core Services Committee/National Health 
Committee
• Effectiveness
• Efficiency
• Equity
• Acceptability
'Consensus conferences' for specialized services;
Recommend core services for given year
Oregon (US) Developed Quality of Well-Being Scale;
Beginning in 1989 Health Services Commission Used scale to establish cost-effectiveness rankings;
Revised rankings after public backlash;
Continued to use ranked list of condition-treatment pairs
Recently more emphasis on evidence base for recommendations
UK Appraisal of new health technologies;
Ongoing, beginning in 1999 National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE)
Development of clinical guidelines;
Explicit use of cost-effectiveness evaluations
Appeal possible on narrow grounds
Table 3: Overview of centralized priority setting efforts (Continued)Page 4 of 13
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vided. The principle of necessity was defined very broadly,
basically meaning any intervention that could provide
some medical benefit. With regard to the principle of
effectiveness, the committee distinguished between inter-
ventions where there was evidence for an effect, where
there was limited evidence, and where there was no evi-
dence. The services would be further narrowed down by
those that gave value for money, by only funding efficient
services, and finally, services that were best dealt with by
the individuals themselves were excluded. This latter crite-
rion was not meant to exclude lifestyle choices, such as ill-
ness because of bad eating habits. Rather, it was meant to
exclude services that could easily be paid for by the indi-
viduals themselves. One example the committee gave was
routine adult dental care. Although such dental care is
necessary, effective and efficient, adults can easily pay for
such services out of pocket, and it is therefore best left to
an individual's responsibility. There was also a strong
focus on solidarity and emphasis on approaching macro-
level decisions from the community point of view. While
Dutch attitudes seemed to be shifting to accept more reli-
ance on personal responsibility, the Dunning Committee
did not want changes based on this shift to overlook the
needs of vulnerable populations [26].
Sweden
In 1992, Sweden convened the Parliamentary Priorities
Commission. Much work on substantive issues was left to
local health authorities; however the central government
commission outlined three platform principles: human
dignity, need and solidarity, and cost-efficiency. The com-
mission defined five priority groups based on the type of
disease or treatment in question [17]. While cost-effi-
ciency was listed as a platform principle, the committee
was clear that cost should only be considered in compar-
ing treatments for the same condition, and that measures
of effectiveness that attempt to quantify quality of life,
such as quality adjusted life years (QALYs), should not be
used. As in the Netherlands, there was an emphasis on sol-
idarity and needs of vulnerable populations. In 1994,
Sweden convened a second committee, which focused
more on eliciting public opinions, a factor that had virtu-
ally no role in the work of the first commission [21].
Denmark
In 1996 the Danish Council of Ethics laid out values that
should form the basis of the health service: equality, soli-
darity, security, and autonomy. From these values, the
council derived a general goal for the health service,
framed in terms of "opportunity for self-expression...irre-
spective of...social background and economic ability"
[28]. In attempting to fulfill this general goal, there were a
number of "partial goals" under consideration, including
equity, quality, cost-effectiveness, and democracy. The
committee was explicit that these secondary considera-
tions must be "balanced against each other," and that
even once goals are agreed upon it can "become difficult
when these goals and partial goals are to be translated into
decisions with consequences for everyday life in the
health service" [28]. However, it did not specify methods
for choosing between them.
Explicit priority setting efforts: the defining 
practices approach
Rather than begin with abstract principles, Israel, New
Zealand, the UK and the state of Oregon confronted pri-
ority setting in the context of concrete allocation deci-
sions, such as defining a package of publicly funded
services or establishing clinical guidelines.
Oregon
The experience of priority setting in Oregon's Medicaid
program starting in the early 1990's represents the most
explicit, as well as one of the most controversial, examples
of priority setting in health care in the US. The goal of the
program was to extend coverage to all Oregonians below
100% of the federal poverty level (as opposed to 58% FPL,
as it was previously) by limiting coverage to a basic bun-
dle of services decided by the Medicaid budget and a cost-
effectiveness ranking of available medical services [29-
32]. The Oregon process was concerned with incorporat-
ing public values from the beginning, and the Oregon
Health Services Commission sponsored eleven public
hearings, forty-seven town meetings and fielded a tele-
phone survey before the initial rankings were decided
[29]. The information gathered was employed in develop-
ing the Quality-of Well-Being Scale used to determine the
cost-effectiveness ranking of condition treatment pairs
and subsequently the services that would be covered by
Medicaid [33]. This initial method was, however, aban-
doned because of public outcry over the resulting ranking
of services. In response to this public reaction as well as
criticism of the methodology, the Commission basically
set out to rank health care services based on more broadly
defined criteria, where expert knowledge and intuitive
judgments by the Commissioners about appropriateness
played a much larger role. While the program of rationing
Medicaid services in Oregon was successful in covering a
larger population and reducing the number of uninsured,
it was extremely controversial and faced a number of
political and practical roadblocks along the way [32]. The
Oregon Health Services Commission continues to this
day and continues to update the methodology used to pri-
oritize and the resulting list of prioritized services. There
are several community representatives on this Commis-
sion, although its ongoing work is not accompanied by as
much public discussion as was the original implementa-
tion of the program. Oregon presents an example of bothPage 5 of 13
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ority setting in the US context.
New Zealand
In 1993, New Zealand established its first National Advi-
sory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support
Services to evaluate which services should be included in
the publicly funded health package. While recognizing
that existing practices represented an ad hoc list of priori-
ties [34], the Core Services Committee started with this list
and worked to identify: 1) discrepancies in provision and
management of services (between Maori and non-Maori,
men and women, urban and non-urban populations,
populations in different geographic regions, etc.), 2) areas
where efficiency could be improved, and 3) preferences of
communities regarding health care.
While the committee in New Zealand discussed principles
in much the same way as other commissions, the discus-
sion occurred in the context of making recommendations
about covered services. The committee rejected the idea of
having an "Oregon-like" list of services constitute the
basic package, but did define eligibility criteria for cover-
age of specific services. In order to make appropriate rec-
ommendations, the Committee looked at unit cost and
volume of treatment data for common conditions and
identified areas where efficiency could be improved
[34,35]. They also used information on public values and
opinions, gathered through public meetings, to inform
their recommendations. Subsequently, the Committee,
renamed the National Health Committee (NHC) in 1996,
met yearly to reevaluate and recommend changes to pub-
licly funded health services based on new information or
developments.
Israel
In 1995 Israel passed a National Health Insurance (NHI)
Law, guaranteeing health insurance coverage to all citi-
zens. The insurance would be provided by competing pri-
vate sick funds, with the government acting as the single
payer. Under the NHI law, all of the sick funds are
required to provide the same basic basket of services to
enrollees, with services not in the basic basket available at
additional cost to the individual. When the law was first
adopted it was decided that the basket comprising the
extensive list of services offered by the largest existing sick
fund at that time would also be the basic basket covered
under the law. Thus, as in New Zealand, no explicit proc-
ess for deciding on the basic basket was undertaken at the
time, though it was recognized that a process was needed
for updating the basic basket of services [36,37].
The Ministry of Health created a process to undertake
technology assessment and make recommendations
regarding the updating of the basic basket of services.
Under this system new technologies are screened on a reg-
ular basis in order to identify those with no existing alter-
native or with significant clinical efficacy compared with
existing technologies. The assessment of these technolo-
gies includes the "evaluation of evidence-based clinical,
epidemiological and economic aspects" [[38], p 172].
After several ad-hoc teams assess these aspects of the iden-
tified set of new technologies, their evaluations are passed
on to the Medical Technology Forum, chaired by the
Director of Medical Technology and including senior offi-
cials, managers, and researchers in technology assess-
ment. Using a set of guiding criteria (including
considerations such as the potential of the technology to
prevent mortality or morbidity, the number of patients to
benefit, the financial burden on society and the individual
patient, and whether the net gain to society is higher than
the cost) the Forum grades each technology on a scale of
1–10 and categorizes each as high, intermediate, or low
priority. The rankings are then passed on to a National
Advisory Committee, which, as of 1999, includes public
representatives in addition to officials from the Ministries
of Health and Finance and the sick funds. The Committee
takes into account the assessments and recommends
whether new technologies should be included in the basic
basket, as well as limitations on their use [38].
United Kingdom
From its early days, the idea of rationing was a conten-
tious political issue in the British National Health Service
(NHS) [15,39]. When other countries began convening
commissions on priority setting there was a call by some
for the UK to follow [19,40-43]. Instead, in 1999 the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (now the
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence)
(NICE) was established to: 1) appraise new health tech-
nologies, 2) develop clinical guidelines, and 3) assess
interventional procedures [44,45]. In conducting these
activities, NICE addresses questions including what con-
stitutes necessary and appropriate care, how to incorpo-
rate cost-effectiveness considerations, and what
interventions should be publicly funded. NICE also
includes various pathways for public input.
Criteria for evaluating priority setting efforts
How well did these priority setting efforts succeed? We
propose three criteria for evaluating these efforts. The first
criterion is adequate public input in the priority setting
exercise. The second criterion is appropriate principles,
including the incorporation of an evaluation of the costs
and benefits of interventions. The third criterion concerns
the effect of the prioritization effort: has it actually had an
impact on policy and practice, including the establish-
ment of a review process to evaluate performance (Table
4). Let us briefly justify the selection of these criteria.Page 6 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:4 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/4It has often been stressed in the prioritization literature
that it is necessary to engage the public in order to gain
acceptance for the often painful choices that need to be
made. This can be achieved through different mecha-
nisms, including, for example, group exercises in choos-
ing hypothetical health care packages [3,46-48]. Not only
is it necessary to educate the public about the need for pri-
oritization, it is also generally accepted that the public
should have a real influence on how these choices are
made. Most commentators reject an approach where these
decisions are made by technocrats behind closed doors
without public input. While it can be difficult to realize,
public engagement with prioritization issues is necessary
to ensure fairness and legitimacy [5,10,49-51] Exactly
how this is done can vary. One may simply attempt to
elicit the views of the public and incorporate these into
decision making [52], or one may aim at a more delibera-
tive process where one arrives at a consensus after a public
dialogue. Still unresolved are the questions of how exten-
sive public involvement in the priority setting process
should be and who best represents the public's views.
There are also problems of ensuring that avenues for pub-
lic input established on paper are implemented and that
input reflects broad and relevant community views [52-
55].
Principles and procedures are supposed to help ensure
prioritization is consistent with society's values and goals
for the health care system. In fact, most commissions were
established precisely to establish shared values on which
prioritization decisions can be based. Producing value for
money is central to efficiently allocating health care
resources and will likely lead to fairer allocation as well.
We have therefore noted specifically how the commis-
sions have dealt with the issue of cost. A successful
approach will integrate cost considerations, rather than
acknowledging but avoiding the task of directly address-
ing the issue. Despite its limitations, CEA is currently the
best developed and most used approach to assess whether
interventions produce value for money [56-62].
Discussions about how to fairly and efficiently set priori-
ties serve little purpose if they do not impact how priori-
ties are established. Hence, exercises in priority setting
must be concretely linked to policy and practice, and we
expect that the work of government commissions will
have some influence on what interventions are covered. In
some cases, such as for NICE in the UK, the bodies have a
direct influence on coverage decisions, and are set up to
influence health policy. For commissions given the task of
establishing a framework for priority setting, the influence
will have to be more indirect. One important result would
be if the work has led to an increased awareness among
the general public about the need for priority setting, as
we noted above. Another result would be if some of the
concrete recommendations by the commission were sub-
sequently adopted. Because of the controversial nature of
most prioritization decisions, it is particularly important
to note what procedures have been established for review
and appeal of decisions reached.
Evaluating the eight efforts on priority setting
The approaches of the eight countries we consider vary in
how well they fulfilled these criteria.
Solicitation of public input and promotion of public 
discussion and education
To fully evaluate the extent to which the priority setting
bodies have promoted public discussion and education,
we would have to distinguish between what the commis-
sions did to encourage discussion during their tenure, and
any effects the commissions have had on subsequent pub-
lic involvement. Here we will confine ourselves to the
involvement during the existence of the commissions,
and the structures set up by the standing bodies estab-
lished. All the priority setting bodies recognized the
importance of transparency in setting priorities, by
emphasizing the importance of promoting public discus-
sion in order to make the need for priority setting clear.
The Swedish commission, for example, emphasized that
public discussions of priorities help clarify the reasons
and methods on which priority setting decisions are based
[21]. Similarly, the Dutch Committee emphasized the
importance of introducing the topic of priorities into pub-
lic discussion, not only to make people aware of the need
for prioritization, but to encourage individuals to make
Table 4: Criteria by which to judge priority setting efforts
(1) Public input and discussion solicit public input in order to inform health professionals and policy makers about the beliefs, opinions, and 
preferences of the public. promote a public discussion which aims to educate the public about the need for 
and options for setting priorities
(2) Appropriate principles establish a coherent, specific and action guiding set of publicly acceptable principles on which to base 
priorities, including a practically useful and balanced method for incorporating cost into the prioritization 
process
(3) Effect on policy and practice exhibit a sustained effect on the policy and practice of health care priority setting, including through the 
establishment of an iterative process for review, evaluation, and reconsideration of priority setting 
determinationsPage 7 of 13
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Commissions, however, varied in the way the public was
involved.
While Norway involved public representatives on its com-
missions, the Norwegian Commissions only discussed the
importance of public education, whereas the Danish
Council actually held public meetings and distributed
materials on priority setting [28]. The Commissions in the
Netherlands and Sweden actively incorporated feedback
from public meetings and surveys into their deliberations
[21,27]. The second Swedish commission referred to four
public surveys, two of which it funded, and held five
regional conferences[21,63]. The Dutch committee set out
a plan for a long-term program to solicit feedback from
various consumer groups, including women, the elderly,
the "low-involved," and different patient groups by begin-
ning a discussion primarily through the media, then solic-
iting feedback through various meetings [27].
One of the stated goals of the New Zealand's Core Services
Committee was to ensure that core health services "reflect
the diverse needs and values of the population being
served" [34]. The first step in this effort is to inform the
public and engage them in a discussion of health services.
The New Zealand Committee held periodic "Best of
Health" public meetings based around discussion docu-
ments. The views expressed at these meetings were part of
the committee's considerations in making recommenda-
tions regarding core services [64]. Further, they recom-
mended the continuation of consultation by the Health
Authorities in charge of funding services with communi-
ties, including Maori communities, in different regions
[34,65,66]. The NICE model of public involvement
allows for public input at different levels on both broad
principles and specific guideline development. Input is
solicited by including lay members with relevant experi-
ence on guideline committees, posting draft guidelines on
NICE's website to solicit public feedback before issuing
final guidelines, and convening Citizens Councils, com-
posed of 30 individuals representing the public, to discuss
questions such as how to define and evaluate clinical
needs for treatment or what role age should play in mak-
ing clinical decisions [44].
In Israel, explicit public involvement was not taken into
account in establishing the terms of the NHI Law in 1995,
though the importance of involving members of the pub-
lic in the subsequent decision-making process about the
basic basket was quickly realized. Thus, beginning in
1999, a quarter of the membership of the National Advi-
sory Committee that makes the final recommendation to
the Minister of Health regarding which new technologies
should be added to the basic basket were public represent-
atives with no medical background [38].
Establishment of principles
Except the UK, all of the countries considered here started
the discussion by establishing some set of principles on
which to base priorities [14,66]. In the UK, this discussion
has gone on through other avenues, but has not been cen-
tralized and systematic [39]. The principles cited by the
commissions include a range of medical, philosophical,
and economic factors [17,21,27,28,34].
It seems unreasonable to base prioritization on a single
principle. Indeed, when the Norwegian Commission
attempted to formulate a system based exclusively on
severity, it found that important considerations, such as
effectiveness of interventions and cost, were excluded and
saw the need to add additional principles. With multiple
principles, the challenge is determining how to balance
them when they conflict. As the Danish committee
pointed out, balancing "become [s] difficult when [princi-
ples] are to be translated into decisions with conse-
quences for everyday life in the health service" [[28], p
57]. While commissions acknowledged the challenge of
balancing, none solved the problems they identified.
In general there is hesitancy to place much weight on CEA
due to discomfort and uncertainty in dealing with cost. In
Norway, the first commission avoided cost [24], and only
after negative responses did it add the secondary princi-
ples of potential effect and cost-effectiveness. The Danish
committee discussed problems with using cost related
analyses, including uncertainty about what measure of
utility to use and the need for more information. Rather
than addressing these problems, the committee was hesi-
tant to endorse the use of any economic analyses [28]. The
initial Swedish report stated that cost should only be a
deciding factor when "all else is equal"[21]. In both Den-
mark and Sweden, the commissions specified that cost
should only be considered when comparing treatments
for the same illness, such as comparing a titanium hip
prosthesis to a less expensive but less durable steel pros-
thesis [21]. While Israel's process does not include a
requirement that cost-effectiveness specifically be taken
into account in making decisions, it does include an eco-
nomic evaluation that considers the overall cost of includ-
ing a new technology in the basic basket by comparing it
with currently available treatments. In a small number of
cases, explicit cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analysis is
conducted as well ([38] The Dutch Committee in princi-
ple allowed the lack of cost-effectiveness to determine that
an intervention should not be covered.
Only New Zealand lists cost-effectiveness as a primary
consideration [34]. NICE explicitly integrates cost in every
case of guideline development and technology assessment
[44,67]. Still, the use of CEA in NICE guidelines has been
controversial in the past; its recommendation againstPage 8 of 13
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based on cost-effectiveness grounds, for example, caused
an outcry from MS groups, and its final recommendation
was controversial among the medical and research com-
munities as well [34,65,68-72].
Impact on policy and practice
Because of their abstractness, government commissions
that outlined principles have had little direct impact on
their countries' policies. For example, the Danish Council
of Ethics explicitly noted that their partial goals would
sometimes conflict, yet did not set out methods for imple-
menting them in these cases [28]. Even when a commis-
sion outlined priority groups for use in practice, the
guidelines were so broad as to be useless in resolving dif-
ficult prioritization questions [17,24,27]. In Norway, for
example, the division of priority groups into fundamen-
tal, supplementary, low priority and no priority did little
to help resolve questions of choice in individual circum-
stances. Further, the lack of political tension within the
Swedish Commission, which included parliamentary rep-
resentatives of all major parties, was seen by many as a
sign that the group avoided controversial issues central to
priority setting [23].
After the early rounds of priority setting discussions, prin-
ciples set forth by the committees had little direct effect on
health care planning and provision. According to Berg and
van der Grinten, the criteria that make up Dunning's fun-
nel were difficult to implement because of contention
about the definition of "necessary" and the difficulty of
making macro level judgments about the effectiveness
and efficiency in specific cases or whether an intervention
can be left up to individual responsibility. Even when the
Dutch government took the approach of the Dunning
committee seriously, "problematic substantive criteria...,
financial considerations...and political pressures ...made
it very difficult to remove services from the package" of
publicly funded health services [[26], p 124]. In general,
governments and planning groups continued to make
decisions about coverage based on a host of other factors,
including political concerns and media pressure
[14,61,73].
After a decade of discussions and repeat performances by
some commissions, little progress had been made.
Changes in health services after recommendations were
issued did not reflect the extensive discussions and pro-
posals put forth by the commissions [73,74]. One study
showed evidence that less than half of new medical tech-
nologies actually implemented between 1993 and 1997
in Norway fit the Lønning definition of core services [74].
"By 2002, few of the recommendations [of the Lønning
Commissions in Norway] had been implemented" [[24],
p 2003]. In particular, specific priority setting committees
were supposed to issue recommendations for different
fields of medicine, but as of 2007 this had not been done.
While the discussion of priority setting was successfully
started, it was not clear that the government commissions
had any significant impact on actual practices at the pol-
icy, planning, or clinical levels.
The approaches of Israel, the state of Oregon, New Zea-
land and the UK affected policy and practice most directly.
For example, by making specific recommendations
regarding covered services in New Zealand and establish-
ing specific clinical guidelines in the UK, the groups in
these countries have anchored the discussion of priorities
in concrete policy determinations. Yet, within NICE, there
is no systematic review of existing health technologies;
thus there is a bias towards reviewing only new technolo-
gies. While the UK is a step ahead in affecting practice,
there are still improvements to be made in the system.
All the countries that have set up bodies that decide on
priorities, and the state of Oregon, have ongoing proc-
esses that are conducive to iterative reflection on past suc-
cesses and failures. In Israel, new technologies are
screened and assessed for inclusion in the basic basket of
services on a regular basis. Similarly, the ongoing nature
of NICE creates opportunities for review and evaluation of
the process, though the review has been less systematic
than in New Zealand. The yearly reevaluation of the
health services and discussion of other health care issues
by the NHC in New Zealand is the best example of effec-
tive review and evaluation [14,41]. For example, in 1996
the Committee recommended against population screen-
ing for prostate cancer using the prostate specific antigen
(PSA) test, but recommended the question be kept under
review [75]. In 2001 the NHC began a review that culmi-
nated in a 2004 report echoing their earlier recommenda-
tion against population-wide PSA screening [53,76,77].
Rather than attempting to settle questions of prioritiza-
tion with one discussion, the New Zealand Committee
has established an iterative process that allows priority
setting to evolve with medical and political changes.
Finally, one should note that the priority setting efforts
had little effect on the political events that actually led to
the establishment of the priority setting exercises in the
first place. The Norwegian effort did not solve the prob-
lem of waiting lists, the Dutch politicians did not use the
criteria of the Dunning committee to decide what should
be included in the package of health services, and the Ore-
gon effort did not lead to any substantial cost-savings by
eliminating interventions from the services provided that
could be used to increase the number of people covered
by Medicaid [24,26,78].Page 9 of 13
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What can we conclude from this examination of eight pri-
ority setting efforts? First, the bodies established to recom-
mend or decide prioritized interventions have been
relatively successful. They key to ensure impact on policy
and practice is therefore to establish bodies with some
decision making power on what is actually implemented
in the health care system. Although controversial, the pol-
icies in the state of Oregon, Israel, New Zealand and the
UK, have been largely accepted. Second, and in agreement
with an apparent consensus in the literature, formulation
by public bodies of abstract priority setting principles will
not have much impact on policy. In the words of Søren
Holm, "The Danish Council argued that none of the pri-
ority-setting systems which had been produced were really
operational, and all suffered from one or both of two fatal
flaws: .... They were based on a simplistic view about the
purpose of the health care system; and/or they did not
really give any specific guidance as to how one should pri-
oritize" [[79], p. 31]. None of the Commissions given the
task of formulating a principled framework for priority
setting has had much impact on health policy in their
respective countries. This general negative conclusion has
led many commentators, including the Danish Commis-
sion as well as the second Norwegian Commission and
commentators such as Norman Daniels to advocate a dif-
ferent approach [80]. Again, according to Søren Holm, "If
we cannot find rule-based systems which can legitimize
the decisions, we will instead have to devise priority-set-
ting processes that can lend legitimacy to the outcome."
Holm goes on to quote from the Danish Commission
describing such a process
There should be an effort to ensure that decision-mak-
ers at different levels be aware – informed – of which
priority-setting consequences different decisions
entail. The issue is ensuring clearness, the necessary
information being available, and that analyses have
been executed of which consequences different deci-
sions entail. At the same time the public should also
be ensured a higher level of information on which
decisions are made at which levels, and which reasons
there are for the individual decisions. Such openness
is crucial to ensuring that individual decisions can be
subjected to criticism and possibly changed on the
basis of the public debate. For this reason great impor-
tance should also be attached to the health planning
in the counties being organized in such a way as to
ensure the possibility for common citizens to partici-
pate in the decision making process, for instance at
hearings and public meetings. [[79], p.34]
Our third conclusion is, however, that such a process, in
spite of its attractiveness and in spite of the emphasis
placed on public involvement in the prioritization litera-
ture, has also not really been implemented in any of the
priority setting exercises examined here. The two country
commissions mentioned by Holm as proponents of this
approach, Norway and Denmark, have not yet, a decade
after the reports, implemented any process with even the
most rudimentary elements of the public process
described above. In fact, the recommendation in Norway
was that this process should be expert driven, and not
involve much public debate. The processes implemented
in countries with actual priority setting bodies, Israel, New
Zealand, the UK and the state of Oregon in the US, also do
not appear to fit the description of an open and transpar-
ent process with public discussion and decisions about
the trade-offs that need to be made. New Zealand, Israel
and Oregon have largely delegated the decisions about
what services should be included in the health care pack-
age to a body of experts, with few, if any, possibilities for
appeal. NICE in the UK, which perhaps comes closest to
the ideal of a process for evaluating new technologies, has
developed a structure of public involvement at all levels,
and there is a possibility of appealing the decisions
reached. However, the public is not engaged in the envis-
aged debate about what trade-offs need to be made, and
how to balance different principles. The basis for appeal is
also very narrow; successful appeals can only be made if
the committee has made obvious mistakes. The three
grounds for appeal are only:
▪ The Institute has failed to act fairly and in accordance
with its procedures;
▪ The Institute has prepared guidance which is perverse in
the light of the evidence submitted; and
▪ The Institute has exceeded its powers
NICE to a large extent limits itself to examining new tech-
nologies for their cost-effectiveness, where the major
determinant of the decision reached rests on the examina-
tion of technical evidence of proven effect, and the costs
of the procedure in relation to a more or less pre-set level
of cost-effectiveness. In that respect it resembles more a
traditional technology assessment agency, rather than a
body with a mandate to involve the public in an open dia-
logue about the difficult moral choices in health care pri-
ority setting. In Israel the National Advisory Committee
included about a third of the members without any med-
ical background. In its advisory role, however, the com-
mittee largely relied on the expert judgments of the
Medical Technology Forum, and the final decision about
what to include for reimbursement was reached without
any public discussion or involvement.
Against this one might want to argue that the case of Ore-
gon demonstrates that the success of a community ledPage 10 of 13
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ranking based on a mechanical application of cost-benefit
calculation was abandoned in favor of judgments by a
panel with a sizable proportion of community members.
This revised methodology was accepted and has been uti-
lized successfully during the subsequent decade. In spite
of this, there are two reasons why Oregon is not a counter-
example to the position taken in this paper. First, the
Health Services Commission has recently recognized that
it is necessary to place a much greater emphasis on the evi-
dence for the effectiveness of interventions and its cost-
effectiveness [81]. One can therefore expect that the rec-
ommendations by experts will place a much larger role in
deciding the prioritized list. Second, although there were
a large number of public hearings and input during the
initial work of the Commission, the work today is largely
carried out without much public debate. Furthermore, the
initial discussion probably had more to do with gaining
acceptance and legitimacy for the process, than about a
public deliberation about the conflicting values and rea-
sons that would initially lead different people to come to
different conclusions but then, as a result of the open pub-
lic debate, result in consensus about the list of priorities
[78].
What does this mean for the future direction of health care
priority setting? In our view, it suggests that we perhaps
should reevaluate the place for some type of expert led
model of implicit rationing and priority setting in health
care. One the one hand, the experience of the priority set-
ting commissions of countries such as Norway, the Neth-
erlands, and Denmark suggests that we will never reach
agreement about an explicit framework for priority set-
ting. Although these countries did not establish any prior-
ity setting bodies with decision-making power, the
intention was that the recommendations of the commis-
sions should be implemented. As we discussed above, this
has not yet happened. On the other hand, the experience
of actual priority setting efforts in Israel, New Zealand,
Oregon and the UK, suggests that this is best done by a
group of experts who consider the evidence for the effec-
tiveness of various interventions, without much public
involvement and discussion. The experience in these
countries show that such an expert led process may be
accepted by the general public. The actual acceptance of
the public that we have seen in these countries, could, of
course, simply be a reflection of the fact that the public
feels powerless to influence the process. Some of the pub-
lic criticism of the specific decisions made by NICE may
be a reflection of that fact. The relative success of this
approach also does not mean that there should be no
public involvement, nor an absence of appeal processes.
All the priority setting bodies examined here involve the
public and allow for an appeal of the decisions, but it is
quite clear that it is much less than is envisaged by those
who advocate open and transparent processes involving
the public. The challenge of health care prioritization
would therefore seem to be to identify an appropriate bal-
ance between an expert led process and a process that
emphasizes public involvement in decision making. We
recognize that this conclusion is controversial, and goes
against much of the thinking in the current prioritization
literature, where there is much more emphasis on public
involvement. The examination of the prioritization efforts
discussed in this paper, however, leads us to conclude that
implementation of public discussion and open and trans-
parent deliberative processes has not been achieved. In
spite of this, some countries have been able to achieve
some degree of public acceptance of actual rationing. In
light of this, one of the main challenges for the priority
setting field would be propose appropriate levels of public
involvement and appeal that is much less extensive than
the usual rhetoric suggests, but that still ensures that deci-
sions reached are legitimate.
One key element for appropriate public involvement
would probably be transparency in providing reasons for
decisions. Even though there may not be much possibility
of actually appealing a decision and reversing it, the pos-
sibility of public discussion and criticism of justifications
for decisions, will in all likelihood influence priority set-
ting bodies. Although such influence is largely indirect, in
the long run it will probably be more substantial than the
formal ability to directly appeal particular decisions.
Declaration of competing interests
The author(s) declare that they have no competing inter-
ests.
Authors' contributions
Both authors have been involved in initiating the project,
carrying out the background research, and the writing of
the article. Both authors have read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgements
We thank John Barton, Anthony Culyer, Marion Danis, Eli Feiring, Lindsay 
Hampson, Søren Holm, Steven Pearson, Jehanna Peerzada, Larry Temkin 
and, in particular, Ezekiel Emanuel for their helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. This research was supported by the Intramural Research Program of 
the NIH Clinical Center. The opinions expressed are the authors' own. 
They do not reflect any position or policy of the National Institutes of 
Health, US Public Health Service, or Department of Health and Human 
Services.
References
1. Beauchamp TL, Childress JF: Principles of Biomedical Ethics.  5th
edition. New York , Oxford University Press; 2001. 
2. Eddy DM: Clinical Decision-making: From Theory to Practice.
The Individual vs Society. Resolving the Conflict.  JAMA 1991,
265:2405-2396.Page 11 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:4 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/43. Eddy DM: Clinical Decision-making: From Theory to Practice.
The Individual vs Society. Is There a Conflict?   JAMA 1991,
265:1446, 1449-1450.
4. Emanuel EJ: Justice and Managed Care.  Four Principles for the
Just Allocation of Health Care Resources.  Hastings Center
Report 2000, 30:8-16.
5. Fleck LM: Healthcare Justice and Rational Democratic Delib-
eration.  American Journal of Bioethics 2001, 1:20-21.
6. Rawls J: A Theory of Justice.  Cambridge , Belknap Press of Harvard
University; 1999. 
7. Alexander GC, Werner RM, Ubel PA: The Costs of Denying Scar-
city.  Archives of Internal Medicine 2004, 164:593-596.
8. Anand G: Who Gets Health Care?  Rationing in an Age of Ris-
ing Costs: Life Support: The Big Secret in Health Care:
Rationing is Here; With Little Guidance, Workers On Front
Lines Decide Who Gets What Treatment; Nurse
Micheletti's Tough Calls.  The Wall Street Journal 2003.
9. Bloche MG, Jacobson PD: The Supreme Court and Bedside
Rationing.  JAMA 2000, 284:2776-2779.
10. Fleck LM: Rationing: Don't Give Up.  Hastings Center Report 2002,
32:35-36.
11. Freudenheim M: Broader Health Coverage May Depend on
Less.  New York Times 2004.
12. Fleck LM: Just Caring: Health Reform and Health Care
Rationing.  Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1994, 19:435-443.
13. Dixon J, Welch HG: Priority Setting: Lessons From Oregon.
Lancet 1991, 337:891-894.
14. Ham C: Priority Setting in Health Care: Learning from Inter-
national Experience.  Health Policy 1997, 42:49-66.
15. Ham C: Priority Setting in the NHS: Reports from Six Dis-
tricts.  BMJ 1993, 307:435-438.
16. Hansson LF, Norheim OF, Ruyter KW: Equality, Explicitness,
Severity, and Rigidity: the Oregon Plan Evaluated from a
Scandinavian Perspective.  Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1994,
19:343-366.
17. Health Care and Medical Priorities Commission: No Easy Choices:
The Difficult Priorities of Healthcare.  Stockoholm , Ministry of
Health and Social Affairs; 1993. 
18. Honigsbaum F, Calltorp J, Ham C, Holmstrom S: Priority Setting
Processes for Healthcare.  Oxford , Radcliffe Medical Press; 1995. 
19. Klein R: Puzzling out Priorities. Why We Must Acknowledge
that Rationing is a Political Process.  BMJ 1998, 317:959-960.
20. Street A, Richardson J: The Value of Health Care: What Can
We Learn from Oregon?  Australian Health Review 1992,
15:124-134.
21. Swedish Parliamentary Priorities Commission : Priorities in Health
Care: Ethics, Economy, Implementation.  Stockholm , Ministry
of Health and Social Affairs; 1995. 
22. Ham C: What Can We Learn from International Experience?
In Rationing Health Care Edited by: Maxwell R. Edinburgh , Churchill
Livingstone; 1995. 
23. Calltorp J: Priority Setting in Health Policy in Sweden and a
Comparison with Norway.    Health Policy 1999, 50:1-22.
24. Norheim OF: Norway.  In Reasonable Rationing: International Experi-
ence of Priority Setting in Health Care Edited by: Ham C, Robert G. Phil-
adelphia , Open University Press; 2003. 
25. Holm S: Goodbye to the Simple Solutions: the Second Phase
of Priority Setting in Health Care.  BMJ 1998, 317:1000-1002.
26. Berg M, van der Grinten T: The Netherlands.  In Reasonable Ration-
ing: International Experience of Priority Setting in Health Care Edited by:
Ham C, Robert G. Philadelphia , Open University Press; 2003. 
27. Committee on Choices in Health Care : Choices in Health Care.
Edited by: Ministry of Welfare HCA. Rijswijk ; 1992. 
28. Danish Council of Ethics : Priority-setting in the Health Service.
1997.
29. Brown LD: The National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan.
Health Affairs 1991, 10:28-51.
30. Fox DM, Leichter HM: State model: Oregon. The Ups and
Downs of Oregon's Rationing Plan.  Health Affairs 1993,
12:66-70.
31. Fox DM, Leichter HM: Rationing Care in Oregon: the New
Accountability.  Health Affairs 1991, 10:7-27.
32. Ham C: Retracing the Oregon Trail: the Experience of
Rationing and the Oregon Health Plan.  In Reasonable Rationing:
International Experience of Priority Setting in Health Care Edited by: Ham
C, Robert G. Buckingham , Open University Press; 1998. 
33. Blumstein JF: The Oregon Experiment: The Role of Cost-Ben-
efit Analysis in the Allocation of Medicaid Funds.  Social Science
and Medicine 1997, 45:545-554.
34. National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support
Services: Core Health and Disability Support Services for
1993/94.  Wellington , National Advisory Committee on Core
Health and Disability Support Services; 1992. 
35. National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support
Services: Core Services for 1995/96.  In Wellington  National Advi-
sory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services;
1994. 
36. Chinitz D, Israeli A: Health Reform and Rationing in Israel.
Health Affairs 1997, 16:205-210.
37. Chinitz D, Shalev C, Galai N, Israeli A: The Second Phase of Pri-
ority Setting: Israel's Basic Basket of Health Services: the
Importance of Being Explicitly Implicit.  BMJ 1998,
317:1005-1007.
38. Shani S, Siebzehner MI, Luxenberg O, Shemer J: Setting Priorities
for the Adoption of Health Technologies on a National
Level—the Israeli Experience.  Health Policy 2000, 54:169-185.
39. Klein R, Day P, Redmayne S: Managing Scarcity: Priority Setting
and Rationing in the National Health Service.  Buckingham,
Open University Press; 1996. 
40. Ham C: Health Care Rationing.  BMJ 1995, 310:1483-1484.
41. Klein R: Priorities and Rationing: Pragmatism or Principles?
BMJ 1995, 311:761-762.
42. McKee M, Figueras J: Setting Priorities, Can Britain Learn from
Sweden?  BMJ 1996, 312:691-694.
43. Turnberg L, Lessof M, Watkins P: Physicians Clarify Their Pro-
posal for a National Council for Health Care Priorities.  BMJ
1996, 312:1604b-1605.
44. National Institute for Clinical Excellence   [http://
www.nice.org.uk]
45. Rawlins M: In Pursuit of Quality: the National Institute for
Clinical Excellence.  Lancet 1999, 353:1079-1083.
46. Danis M, Biddle AK, Dorr Goold S: Enrollees Choose Priorities
for Medicare.  Gerontologist 2004, 44:58-67.
47. Danis M, Biddle AK, Dorr Goold S: Insurance Benefit Prefer-
ences of the Low-income Uninsured.  Journal of General Internal
Medicine 2002, 17:125-133.
48. Eddy DM: Clinical Decision-making: From Theory to Practice.
Connecting Value and Costs. Whom Do We Ask, and What
Do We Ask Them.  JAMA 1990, 264:1737-1739.
49. Emanuel EJ: Choice and Representation in Health Care.    Med
Care Research and Review 1999, 56:113-140.
50. Emanuel EJ, Emanuel LL: Preserving Community in Health Care.
Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law 1997, 22:147-184.
51. Fleck LM: Just Caring: Oregon, Health Care Rationing, and
Informed Democratic Deliberation.  Journal of Medicine and Phi-
losophy 1994, 19:367-388.
52. Ubel PA: The challenge of measuring community values in
ways appropriate for setting health care priorities.  Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal 1999, 9:263-284.
53. Abelson J, Eyles J, McLeod C, Collins P, McMullan C, Forest PG: Does
Deliberation Make a Difference?  Results From a Citizens
Panel Study of Health Goals Priority Setting.    Health Policy
2003, 66:95-106.
54. Abelson J, Forest PG, Eyles J, Smith P, Martin E, Gauvin FP: Deliber-
ations About Deliberative Methods: Issues in the Design and
Evaluation of Public Participation Processes.  Social Science and
Medicine 2003, 57:239-251.
55. Wailoo A, Roberts J, Brazier J, McCabe C: Efficiency, Equity, and
NICE Clinical Guidelines.  BMJ 2004, 328:536-537.
56. Donaldson C, Currie G, Mitton C: Cost Effectiveness Analysis in
Health Care: Contraindications.  BMJ 2002, 325:891-894.
57. Garber AM: Cost-Effectiveness and Evidence Evaluation As
Criteria For Coverage Policy.  Health Affairs (web exclusive) 2004.
58. Garber AM, Phelps CE: Economic Foundations of Cost-effec-
tiveness Analysis.  Journal of Health Economics 1997, 16:1-31.
59. Gold MR, Siegel JE, Russell LB, Weinstein M: Cost-Effectiveness in
Health and Medicine.  New York , Oxford University Press; 1996. 
60. Nord E: Cost-Value Analysis in Health Care: Making Sense
out of QALYs.  New York , Cambridge University Press; 1999. 
61. Robinson R: Limits to Rationality: Economics, Economists and
Priority Setting.  Health Policy 1999, 49:13-26.Page 12 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
International Journal for Equity in Health 2008, 7:4 http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/7/1/4Publish with BioMed Central   and  every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
62. Ubel PA: Pricing Life: Why It's Time for Health Care Ration-
ing.  Cambridge , MIT Press; 2000. 
63. Rosen P, Karlberg I: Opinions of Swedish Citizens, Health-care
Politicians, Administrators and Doctors on Rationing and
Health-care Financing.  Health Expectations 2002, 5:148-155.
64. Edgar W: Rationing Health Care in New Zealand -- How the
Public Has a Say.  In The Global Challenges of Health Care Rationing
Edited by: Coulter A, Ham C. Philadelphia , Open University Press;
2000. 
65. Ashton T, Cumming J, Devlin N: Priority-setting in New Zealand:
Translating Principles into Practice.  Journal of Health Services
Research and Policy 2000, 5:170-175.
66. Ham C, Robert G: Reasonable rationing: International experi-
ence of priority setting in health care.  Buckingham , Open Uni-
versity Press; 2003. 
67. Devlin N, Parkin D: Does NICE Have a Cost-effectiveness
Threshold and What Other Factors Influence Its Decisions?
A Binary Choice Analysis.  Health Economics 2004, 13:437-452.
68. Birch S, Gafni A: The 'NICE' Approach to Technology Assess-
ment: an Economics Perspective.  Health Care Management Sci-
ence 2004, 7:35-41.
69. Birch S, Gafni A: On Being NICE in the UK: Guidelines for
Technology Appraisal for the NHS in England and Wales.
Health Economics 2002, 11:185-191.
70. Ellis SJ: Bad Decision NICE.  Lancet 2002, 359:447.
71. Howden-Chapman P, Ashton T: Public Purchasing and Private
Priorities for Healthcare in New Zealand.  Health Policy 2000,
54:27-43.
72. Mayor S: Health Department to Fund Interferon Beta Despite
Institute's Ruling.  BMJ 2001, 323:1087.
73. Hunter DJ: Desperately Seeking Solutions: Rationing Health
Care.  London , Longman; 1997. 
74. Norheim OF, Ekeberg O, Evensen SA, Halvorsen M, Kvernebo K:
Adoption of New Health Care Services in Norway (1993-
1997): Specialists' Self-assessment According to National
Criteria for Priority Setting.  Health Policy 2001, 56:65-79.
75. National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support
Services: Fifth Annual Report.  Wellington , National Advisory
Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services; 1996. 
76. National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support
Services : Tenth Annual Report.  Wellington , National Advisory
Committee on Core Health and Disability Support; 2001. 
77. National Health Committee : Prostate Cancer Screening in New
Zealand.  Wellington , National Health Committee; 2004. 
78. Jacobs L, Marmor T, Oberlander J: Report from the field. The
Oregon health plan and the political paradox of rationing:
What advocates and critics have claimed and what Oregon
did.  Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law 1999, 24:.
79. Holm S: Developments in the Nordic countries: goodbye to
the simple solutions.  In The Global Challenge of Health Care Ration-
ing Edited by: Coulter A, Ham C. Buckingham , Open University Press;
2000:29-37. 
80. Daniels N: Accountability for reasonableness in private and
public health insurance.  In The global challenge of health care ration-
ing Edited by: Coulter A, Ham C. Buckingham , Open University Press;
2000:89-106. 
81. Oregon Health Services Commission : Prioritization of Health
Care Services. A Report to the Governor and the 73rd Ore-
gon Legislative Assembly.   Office of Oregon Health Policy and
Research, Department of Administrative Services; 2005. Page 13 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
